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Introduction 
Housing can be an incredibly emotive issue.  Shelter and a sense of home is essential to our 
well-being, which is why the right to housing is enshrined in the conventions of the United 
Nations and, in turn, ratified by most national governments.  Housing provides us with 
sanctuary, a sense of identity and belonging, a firm base from which to venture out into the 
wider world.  Housing is also seen as an asset: the most expensive purchase most families 
make or an investment for landlords seeking a steady yield.  Building and selling houses can 
be highly profitable, but they can also bankrupt households, builders, developers and banks if 
the market plummets.  Losing one’s home is highly distressing, as is the sense that one cannot 
afford a home due to changing house or rental prices.  Living in substandard housing or being 
homeless can be detrimental to one’s mental and physical health.  Providing high quality, 
affordable and securely tenured housing for all citizens is thus a core stated ambition of most 
governments.  However, there is a marked difference between rhetoric and reality, in part due 
to the ideology of ruling parties and the machinations of vested interests, but also due to 
housing being a complex and costly endeavour.  Furthermore, there is also increasingly a 
tension between housing as a form of shelter (its use value) and housing as an asset class (its 
exchange value), particularly in light of the finanzialization of mortgage markets (Aalbers, 
2008) 
 The central thesis we advance in this essay is that housing in Ireland is perpetually in 
crisis -- that the issues noted above and others are prevalent, effecting many households, 
especially those with a mortgage, those renting, and those residing in or waiting for social 
housing.  What is more the crisis in housing pre-dates the crash of 2007/8, building up for at 
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least twenty years and evolving through three distinct phases: 1993-2006 (the Celtic Tiger 
years); 2007-2012 (the crash); 2013- (unstable, uneven and partial rebalancing).  The crises 
of phases two and three were created by the outcomes and policies adopted during phase one, 
and have been deepened by recent austerity policies, placing severe stresses on households 
and the housing sector.  The chapter traces out trends, policy and the multiple crises operating 
within each of these periods and how they have negatively impacted on housing in Ireland, 
especially in the post-crash era.  The conclusion sets out why housing in Ireland evolved 
through these crises and examines what might be done to solve them and provide more robust 
housing policies that will ameliorate against future boom and bust cycles and help transition 
the country out of austerity. 
 
Crisis phase 1: 1993-2006 (the Celtic Tiger years) 
The exact start date of the Celtic Tiger era is still debated, but most commentators accept it 
was between 1991 and 1995.  What is clear is that from the early 1990s the Irish economy 
began to transform with a notable rise in key economic indicators such as GDP and numbers 
in employment.  As the economy grew, the population increased through immigration and 
natural increase and average household size shrank through alterations in family structure.  
Between April 1991 and April 2006 the population of Ireland increased by 704,129 (20%), 
the number of households by 440,437 (43%) (CSO 2014a).  The demand for housing thus 
expanded rapidly, as did the need to produce a more diversified stock that would cater for 
different sized and types of household.  While population and households fell in some 
localised areas, it increased overall in each local authority, and in some it expanded very 
rapidly.  For example, in Kildare and Meath the number of households grew by 85% and 
87%.  This demand had six effects, all of which can be considered a crisis in its own right 
given its dramatic transformative effect and demands: the development of a large 
construction boom as developers sought to produce a large quantity of housing supply; a 
surge in house prices as households competed for seemingly limited stock, especially in 
prime locations; a large increase in household debt, especially relating to mortgage debt; an 
increase in land zoning for new development and speculative acquisitions of land leading to a 
dramatic increase in prices; a significant increase in bank indebtedness as they borrowed on 
the international markets to lend to developers; and the rapid expansion of urban sprawl and 
long distance commuting.  To take each of these in turn. 
4 
 
 Between January 1991 and December 2006 762,631 housing units were completed in 
Ireland, peaking with 93,419 units being built in 2006 alone (see Figure 1; DECLG 2014).  
Even allowing for replacing obsolescent stock, clearly more units were being built than there 
were households being formed, especially in the period 2002-06, sowing the seeds for the 
second phase of crises.  Nonetheless, house prices grew dramatically.  The average new 
house price rose from €78,715 in Dublin and €66,914 for the country as a whole in 1991, to 
€416,225 in Dublin (a 429% increase) and €322,634 for the country as a whole (a 382% 
increase) in 2007 (DECLG 2014).  Secondhand homes followed the same trend, with homes 
in Dublin rising by 551% and 489% outside the capital.  In the same period house building 
costs and wages only doubled (Brawn, 2009).  In Q3 of 1995, the average secondhand house 
price was 4.1 times the average industrial wage of €18,152; by Q2 of 2007 secondhand house 
prices had risen to 11.9 times the average industrial wage of €32,616 (Brawn, 2009).  Not 
unsurprisingly, the total value of household mortgage debt increased dramatically, from €47.2 
billion in 2002 to over €139.8 billion at the end of 2007, with the average size of a new 
mortgage (€266,000) being nearly double the 2002 figure (CSO, 2008).  During this period a 
‘bubble economy’, underpinned by the expansion of debt to households based on perceived 
increases in the value of their homes, drove economic growth (O’Riain, 2014).  Moreover, 
given rapidly rising prices and a strong rental market, the buy-to-let market flourished, with a 
significant number of households becoming ‘amateur’ landlords.  At the same time, state 
investment into social housing was waning whilst demand was growing, with a turn to the 
private sector to provide accommodation through a rent supplement scheme.  Further, social 
housing built during the 1950s was coming to the end of its life, needing either substantial 
refurbishment or replacement. 
 
Figure 1: Number of completed housing units per annum, 1991-2013 
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 Source of data: DECLG (2014) 
 
 Given the demand for prime land for development, pressure was placed on local 
authorities to zone more land and the cost of land rose dramatically, especially in 2004-06 
(see Figure 2).  Land prices jumped in value from just under €10,000 per hectare in 1998 to 
over €58,400 per hectare in 2006 (Savills HOK, 2007). This made Irish land the most 
expensive in Europe: nearly twice the price per hectare of any other European country, and 
three times greater than that in all but four countries.  The result was that land became a 
significant component of housing cost: up to 50% as against a European average of 10–15% 
(O’Toole, 2009).  To enable developers to bid for land and to afford the cost of building bank 
lending increased substantially.  In 2003 the indebtedness of Irish banks to overseas banks 
was just over 10% of Irish GDP.  By 2008 this had risen to 60% of GDP, with over 60% of 
bank assets tied up in property-related lending (Honohan 2010). 
 
Figure 2: (a) land prices in Ireland 1973-2006 (b) land prices in Europe in 2006 
 
Source: HOK Savills (2007) 
 
 Given the cost of land and housing, households who wished to buy a home but who 
had limited resources were forced to either buy property that did not suit their future needs 
with the aim of trading up later (e.g., a one or two bed apartment, with the aim of a family 
home in due course), borrowing beyond their means (e.g., 100% or interest-only mortgages; 
or taking out multiple loans), or buying in an area further away and commuting.  These 
factors created a context in which a growing number of households had a vested interest in 
property prices rising further, thus extending a debt-based model of home-ownership and 
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perpetuating these trends.  Furthermore, the reliance on long distance commuting led to 
extensive urban sprawl and the growth of smaller towns around the principal cities and towns 
(hence the already noted increase in households in Kildare and Meath), mainly reliant on car 
travel given the limited public transport network.  In many cases, the long distance commute 
was well in excess of an hour and half each way and placed a significant fuel cost burden on 
the household, especially as petrol/diesel costs grew in the 2000s. 
 Somewhat ironically, all of these changes were celebrated by the government, the 
construction sector, and the media during the Celtic Tiger era.  They were taken as a sign that 
Ireland was catching up with the rest of the developed West in terms of its economy and 
property sector.  It was suggested that a virtuous circle had been created whereby people 
stepping onto the property ladder were immediately gaining the benefit in their prime asset 
rising in price, and moreover they had more choice in housing options than ever before; the 
government was collecting significant tax revenue (VAT, capital gains tax, stamp duty, 
development levies) that could be re-invested into improved services and infrastructure; and 
the property and banking sector were flourishing whilst helping to bring in overseas 
investment.  Whilst price rises were staggering, potential purchasers and investors were 
assured that there was still plenty of scope for further expansion.  And anyone who suggested 
that these changes were potentially very harmful to households by saddling them with huge 
debt and unsustainable commutes, and to the wider Irish economy by reducing 
competitiveness and producing a bubble that was sure to burst, were roundly attacked by 
politicians, the media, and the property sector.  The worst that could happen they were told 
was a soft landing, wherein prices levelled off to modest growth, and construction slowed in 
pace.  But the bubble did burst, with devastating consequences for citizens, companies and 
the state. 
 
Crisis phase 2: 2007-2012 (the crash) 
As the global economy slowed and the global sub-prime banking crisis began house price 
rises in Ireland started to slow in September 2006, levelling off in March 2007 and remaining 
static until November 2007.  From December 2007 to February 2012 they fell consistently, 
before bottoming out and remaining stable until June 2013 (see Figure 3).  From the peak to 
bottom prices fell by 57.4% in Dublin (houses 55.9% and apartments 63.7%) and 48.7% in 
the rest of the country (CSO 2014b).  Ireland experienced one of the deepest house market 
collapses on record.  What was happening with house prices was a barometer for the wider 
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housing sector.  As 2008 started it was clear that the promise of a soft landing was empty and 
all of the issues built up over the course of the Celtic Tiger years -- massive growth in 
housing and land prices, household and bank debt, over-zoning and over-building -- exploded 
into a new set of crises as the property bubble burst and the Irish banking sector collapsed 
(between May 2007 and November 2008 Irish bank shares fell in value from €55 billion to €4 
billion; Murphy and Devlin, 2009), culminating in the Irish bank guarantee of September 
2008, the creation of the state-owned National Assets Management Agency (NAMA) in 
September 2009 (which bought €74 billion of distressed property loans from the Irish banks), 
and the €85 billion IMF–EU-ECB bailout in November 2010 (see Kitchin et al., 2012).  
 
Figure 3: Overall % change of residential price from 2007 peak 
 
 Source of data: CSO (2014b) 
 
 Whilst the global financial crisis was the trigger to the Irish crisis, Irish banks were 
little exposed to subprime loans; rather, as noted, they were massively exposed to property 
loans in a bubble market, with a highly active construction sector and rabid land speculation 
(O’Toole, 2009).  Significantly exacerbating the situation was it soon became clear that not 
only were prices over-inflated, but that there was a massive oversupply of housing stock and 
over-zoning of land.  Between 2005 and 2007 252,403housing units were completed in 
Ireland (connected to the electricity grid), with another 78,144 added in 2008 and 2009 as 
legacy construction slowed (DECLG 2014).  This is despite the fact that the 2002 census had 
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reported 177,254 vacant units (excluding holiday homes) and the 2006 census 216,533 vacant 
units (excluding holiday homes) (CSO 2014a).  Put simply, housing units had been built in 
excess of demand across the entire country, with several local authorities having vacancy 
rates excluding holiday homes above 15%.  The extent of the oversupply was clarified by the 
2011 census, which reported that 230,056 units were vacant (excluding holiday homes), 
168,427 houses and 61,629 apartments out of a total housing stock of 1,994,845 (CSO 2012).  
Allowing that one would always expect some units to be vacant in any housing market (the 
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (DECLG) suggest 6%) then 
oversupply was approximately 110,000 units.  With supply outstripping demand, there was 
no demand to support existing prices, moreover even if there was, there was no credit to 
enable purchases due to the banking crisis.  
  The most visible manifestation of the oversupply issue were and continue to be 
unfinished estates.  After some speculation as to how many such estates existed in Irish 
towns, cities and countryside, the DECLG undertook a nationwide survey in 2010.  The 
National Survey of Housing Developments reported that there were 2,846 documented 
unfinished estates in Ireland, present in every local authority, of which only 429 were still 
active (Housing Agency 2010; see Figure 4).  With respect to the units on these estates, 
78,195 were complete and occupied, 23,250 complete and vacant, and 19,830 under 
construction, with planning permission in place for a further 58,025 units.  The 2013 survey 
recorded 1,811 estates, which all had outstanding issues of planning and development (with 
estates with issues of vacancy only excluded), on which there were 82,432 dwellings: 57,642 
complete and occupied, 8,694 complete and vacant, and 16,135 under-construction (19.6%) 
(Housing Agency 2013).  Only 193 recorded development activity.  Of these 82,432 
dwellings, 47.9% had incomplete roads, 18.7% incomplete footpaths, 21.9% incomplete 
lighting, 19.4% lacked potable water, 18.6% lacked fully operational storm water systems 
and 19.4% lacked fully operational waste water systems.  Of 4,033 planned open space areas, 
only 2,205 were complete. 
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Figure 4: Unfinished estates in Ireland in 2010 
 
 
 
 Beyond the levels of incompleteness and the lack of key services such as roads, paths, 
public lighting, drinkable water, and sewage systems, those households who found 
themselves residing on these unfinished estates have also had to contend with anti-social 
behaviour and vandalism, with empty units being used for parties, brothels, the selling of 
drugs, squatting, and so on, an unsafe environment for children to play in, isolation from 
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neighbours and a diminished sense of place, and in some rural areas poor access to services 
such as schools, crèches, medical centres and public transport (Kitchin et al., 2014).  In cases 
where an estate management company was meant to be in place, low levels of occupancy 
made such companies unviable, meaning that service provision has been patchy or non-
existent (Mahon and O’Cinneide 2010).  There has also been the stress of an uncertain future 
with regards to the situation improving and personal finances concerning mortgage payments 
and negative equity.  Severe cutbacks in government spending and austerity budgets meant 
that a minimum policy, minimum cost approach has been taken with respect to unfinished 
estates, with the government initially allocating just €5m for tackling health and safety issues 
(e.g., knocking down unsafe structures, fencing off and tidying up areas) and seeking to 
establish Site Resolution Plans (SRPs) for each estate.  SRPs are plans collectively put 
together by all vested interests -- local authorities, developers, banks, residents -- and provide 
a roadmap for how to deal with issues on an estate, but crucially are voluntary and have no 
statutory tools beyond existing legislation that are difficult to apply to bankrupted entities, 
nor finances beyond the government fund.  As such, the extent to which outstanding 
problems are addressed through SRPs varies widely between different local authorities and 
different estates.  What that has meant is that seven years after the start of the crisis, many 
unfinished estates remain unfinished and residents continue to live with a range of on-going 
issues. 
 Beyond vacancy and unfinished estates, there has been a concern related to the quality 
of dwellings constructed during the Celtic Tiger era.  Building control and standards were 
deregulated in Ireland in 1990, with local authority planning enforcement only undertaking 
inspections on 10-15% of sites and not at all stages of development.  Self-certification, plus 
high volume construction, meant that many sub-standard units were built, along with units 
that met minimum standards.  Many units or extensions were built without planning 
permission or building control certification, making them now difficult to sell as banks 
tighten up the conditions for lending.  The highest profile case relates to Priory Hall, where 
187 apartments were found to breach fire hazard regulations, with residents forced to vacate 
their homes for two years whilst continuing to pay mortgages, but there have been numerous 
other similar examples.  Further, there are estimated to be in excess of 20,000 homes whose 
foundation hardcore and building blocks are contaminated with pyrite, though the DECLG 
presently only recognizes 74 estates containing 12,250 units, predominately located in Dublin 
City, Fingal, Meath, Kildare, and Offaly (DECLG 2012).  Again, the government response 
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has been a minimum approach that seeks to minimize any costs to the state, and in some 
cases actively working against resident interests, such as with Priory Hall. 
 In addition to oversupply of dwellings, there was also an oversupply of zoned land 
and commercial premises.  In June 2008, there was 14,191 hectares of serviced zoned land in 
the state, enough for up to 462,000 potential new units (DECLG 2014).  In addition, there 
was another 30,000 hectares of unserviced zoned land.  In many parts of the country there 
was enough zoned land for dozens of years of supply, with the average being 16.8 years if the 
household growth with each local authority continued at the same pace as 1996-2006 (a 
period of rapid growth) (Kitchin et al., 2010).  For example, in Monaghan, a mostly rural 
local authority with a housing stock of 21,658 units in 2006 there was enough zoned land for 
an additional 18,147 units, enough to last for over 50 years.  Not unsurprisingly land prices 
plummeted by between 75-98% in value post-2007.  In Dublin some 782,500m
2
 of office 
space (23%) was vacant in 2010 (Savills HOK 2010).  After a substantial growth in the 
construction of hotels during the Celtic Tiger, at the end of 2008 15,000 guest rooms (26%) 
were deemed to be in-excess of demand (Bacon and Associates, 2009).  And while there are 
no figures on the extend of vacant retail space, shopping centre and retail park space doubled 
between 2005 and 2010 to 2 million m
2
 and 1.32 million m
2
 respectively (CBRE, 2010).  
Much of these commercial properties ended up in NAMA. 
 As the housing market plummeted and the wider economy crashed, with 
unemployment rising from 4.6% in Q4 2007 to peak at 15.1% in Q3 2011 and households 
facing tax rises and pay cuts, increasing financial pressure was placed onto households (CSO 
2014c).  Faced with paying high payment rates on their mortgages many households 
struggled to keep up with payments.  In Q3 2009 3.3% of principal residence mortgages were 
in arrears by more than 90 days.  By Q3 2013 this had peaked at 12.9% (99,189 mortgages) 
in arrears over 90 days, with 18.4% in some level of arrears (141,520) (Central Bank 2013).  
With respect to buy-to-let mortgages, 21.2% (31,227) were in arrears of more than 90 days, 
with 27.4% (40,426) in some level of arrears in Q3 2013.  And as house prices dropped, the 
number of households in negative equity grew to include more than 50% of residential 
properties with a mortgage (RTÉ 2012).  While any loss on a property is not realised unless 
the dwelling is sold, negative equity acts as a spatial trap, constraining the owner from selling 
to escape mortgage arrears, or to trade up or down for more suitable accommodation given 
changes in family circumstance, or is unable to move areas to seek work.  Similarly, rent 
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arrears to local authorities, borough and town councils increased from €32.8m in January 
2008 to €58.5m in December 2011 as tenants struggled to pay their bills (DECLG 2014). 
 The huge house price rises in the Celtic Tiger years, followed by the financial 
pressures of the crash, had significant spillover effects with respect to social housing 
demands and homelessness.  In 1999 there were 39,176 households on the social housing 
waiting list, rising to 48,413 in 2002, 56,249 in 2008, and 98,318 in 2011 (DECLG 2014).  
The vast majority of people on the list are because they cannot afford to purchase or privately 
rented accommodation.  Between 1994 and 2007 47,769 social housing units were built in 
Ireland, plus between 1999 and 2007 9,378 were acquired through purchase and 1,201 long-
term leases acquired through the Rental Accommodation Scheme (RAS) (DECLG 2014).  At 
the same time 22,633 local authority units were sold to tenants (many of these funded by 
mortgages provided by local authorities, a large proportion of which are now in arrears).  
However, the austerity programme implemented by two governments from 2008 onwards 
dramatically reduced state investment in social housing. The capital expenditure for social 
housing was reduced by 80% (from €1.3bn to €275m) between 2008 and 2013 and funding 
for the National Regeneration Programme reduced from €121 million in 2008 to €80 million 
in 2013 a 34% reduction.  Social housing was disproportionately cut under austerity in 
comparison to other sectoral budget reductions. As a result between 2008 and 2013, 10,745 
social housing units were built (nearly all -- 8,267 -- in 2008-09, much of it replacement stock 
in regeneration schemes), 3,293 were acquired through purchase and 8,707 long-term leases 
were acquired through RAS.  While some stock was being built or acquired then, social 
housing needs were outstripping the state’s ability to supply suitable affordable 
accommodation.  Indeed, the proportion of social housing stock has fallen from 18% of all 
residences in 1961 to 8% in 2011 (CSO 2012).  The shortfall in social housing is made-up 
through privately rented accommodation subsidized by rent supplement.  97,260 households 
were receiving rent supplement in late 2010, an increase of 63% on the previous three years, 
with spending rising from €70 million in the mid-1990s to €516.5 million in 2010.   Even 
with the state providing social housing or rent supplement, the financial and other pressures 
placed onto individuals and households during the crash saw a rise in homelessness: between 
2008 and 2011 the number of homeless households increased by 68% to 2,348, with 3,808 
people in accommodation for the homeless, of which 1,648 (including 457 children under the 
age of 15) were in emergency accommodation (Housing Agency 2011: 12). 
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 Further, much social housing stock is acknowledged to be in poor condition and also 
suffers strong social and economic disadvantage with social problems, high unemployment, 
drug addiction, gang-related crime, and low education participation rates.  After extensive 
local community campaigning, prior to the crash the decision was to taken for large-scale 
regeneration schemes in North Dublin (Ballymun) and other Dublin estates, Limerick 
(Moyross and St Mary’s), and a number of regional towns, including Sligo, Dundalk and 
Tralee.  The funding mechanism for such regeneration was public-private partnerships 
(PPPs), involving a transfer of local authority land to a private developer who would then 
build and sell owner-occupier housing and commercial/retail units in return for providing a 
reduced amount of new social housing and some community facilities on the remainder of the 
site (Hearne 2011).  The use of PPPs for regeneration would, it was argued, create a better 
social-mix, diminishing concentrations of social- and low-income-housing (DEHLG, 2005).  
These schemes collapsed with the crash as both private and public finances evaporated.  This 
left thousands of local authority tenants living in substandard conditions whilst awaiting re-
location and many hundreds permanently relocated in preparation for regeneration.  Given 
that old units were slated for demolition and were now half or more empty, and the reduction 
in local authority maintenance budgets, conditions in these estates deteriorated further, 
condemning families to live in unhealthy and unsafe environments.  At the same, planned 
investment in Traveller accommodation also stalled during this period, with 361 Traveller 
families in living on unauthorised sites, 2717 in private rented accommodation, and 663 in 
shared housing in 2013 (DECLG 2014).  
 
Crisis phase 3: 2013- (unstable, uneven and partial rebalancing) 
The levelling off in the fall in house prices, followed by a gradual and then rapid increase of 
prices in Dublin (rising by 24.1% between October 2012 and 2013), is indicative of the start 
of a new phase in the ongoing housing crisis.  This phase sees the continuation of serious 
problems of phase 2, such as social housing need, private rent rises, mortgage arrears, 
negative equity, unfinished estates, but varying levels of change depending on the extent to 
which solutions are put in place and the wider economy starts to recover.  For example, 
117,889 (15.5 per cent) of mortgage accounts remain in arrears.  The numbers of PDH 
(private dwelling home) mortgages in arrears for 90 days ,while dropping 14.3% year-on-year 
, remains at 84,955 to the value of €16.6 billion (Central Bank 2014). There has been little 
change in the buy-to-let (BTL) mortgage accounts with 15,435 BTL in arrears over 720 days.  
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Half of what is being classed as ‘restructuring’ for those in arrears involve the issuing of legal 
repossession notices.  Thus 50,000 PDH households have been issued with legal letters 
seeking repossession and full court proceedings to repossess homes have been initiated in 
23,751 cases. On the buy-to-let side 18,000 mortgage accounts have been issued with 
repossession letters and 8,618 with court proceedings. The numbers receiving rent 
supplement fell by 23% from 2010 to 74,080 (Irish Times 2014a).  Large-scale dezoning 
significantly reduced the amount of serviced zoned land.   
 The new or deepening crises in this period are a lack of supply in some areas and 
associated rapidly rising housing and rental prices, continued problems of social housing 
provision, and rising homelessness in response to a changing rental market.  On a structural 
level, these problems are to an extent the outcome of policies that have not systematically 
addressed the imbalances created by the bubble economy, but rather have acted to delay the 
onset of future crises of mortgage debt while relying on market mechanisms (Downey, 2014). 
 Whilst there was oversupply in every single local authority for both houses and 
apartments (with the exception of South Dublin for houses) in 2011 (Kitchin et al., 2010), the 
extent of this oversupply varied geographically.  Much of rural Ireland had extensive levels 
of vacancy.  In Dublin, the overall vacancy rate for the four local authorities was 8.3% 
(43,707 units; 25,333 of which were apartments) (CSO 2012).  While the vacancy rate of 
houses was low, with only small pockets of oversupply, the vacancy rate for apartments was 
16-19%.  Since 2011, despite emigration nationally, population and households have been 
growing in Dublin through natural increase, labour migration, and household fragmentation.  
Moreover, the levelling off of prices instilled confidence that the bottom of the market had 
been reached.  In combination, the result was an increase in demand by investors trying to 
maximize return on investment and rental yields and households looking to enter the market.  
What oversupply there was in the capital has thus been absorbed, especially in desirable 
areas.  With respect to new supply, however, construction has remained moribund.  In 2012 
only 8,488 units were built nationwide, 1,266 of which were in Dublin, and in 2013 only 
8,301 units were completed nationwide, 1,360 of which were in Dublin (see Figure 1; 
DECLG 2014).  In Q1 2014, only 509 units had been completed in the four Dublin local 
authorities.  The effect of very little new supply for either purchase or rent, but rising 
demand, has led to the inflation in prices.  Daft.ie reported in November 2014 that rents in 
Dublin are 15% higher than a year previously.   
15 
 
 One the effects of rent increases is that families who are income insecure – low wage, 
uncertain hours, flexible working, dependent on welfare – who reside in private rental 
accommodation cannot afford rent increases and rent supplement is not sufficient to cover the 
gap as more than half of those receiving rent supplement (40,000) have to top up their rent.  
Consequently, they are being priced out of their homes in favour of those who can afford the 
new rental price.  Such pressure is not aided by tenants often not knowing their full rights or 
seeking redress through the Private Residential Tenancies Board.  These families find it 
difficult to find alternative private rented accommodation due to rent inflation across the 
rental sector and landlord preferences for tenants not reliant on rent supplement and 
discrimination against such tenants.  With no social housing available, these families find 
themselves homeless.  Nationally, the Simon Community report that in 2012, there was an 
increase of 24 per cent in those using their services, to over 5,000 individuals and families 
(Irish Times 2014b).  The Dublin Region Homeless Executive detail that in 2013 a total of 
4,613 unique individual adults used homeless services in Dublin (across all funded NGO’s 
and statutory services).  They report that demand has strengthened and changed in character 
since Autumn 2013 with more families with child dependents experiencing homelessness.  
During the week beginning April 28
th
 2014, the DRHE confirmed there were 184 households 
with dependent children accommodated in 21 commercial hotels across the Dublin region in 
lieu of provision of more suitable emergency accommodation for families due to a lack of 
capacity in usual emergency accommodation.  The majority of these families were welfare 
dependent private tenants.  The decision to use hotels is seen as a last resort taken in order to 
prevent any increase in rough sleeping in Dublin, especially among adults with dependent 
children.  Dublin’s homeless services secured an exit to tenancies and independent living for 
793 persons in 2013. This is down by 10 per cent on the previous year’s 879 exits, and a 
similar downward trend exists for 2014 due to a lack of suitable accommodation. 
 Assessments by both the Housing Agency and the Economic Social Research Institute 
(ESRI) suggest that without a significant increase in the level of supply that competition for 
property is going to get worse, with rising purchase and rental prices and increasing 
homelessness.  The ESRI report (Morgenroth, 2014) detailed projected housing supply need 
until 2021. It argued that there will be an increase in household demand of 180,000 units, but 
because of oversupply in many parts of the country only 90,000 new units will need to be 
built, some 12,500 per year. 56,000 (60%) of these need to be in Dublin, 8,000 per year. 26% 
more will need to be in the Dublin commuter counties of Meath, Kildare, Louth and 
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Wicklow. Overall, 86% of all new build will need to be in the Greater Dublin region. 
However, in many counties, the report suggests that new supply will not be needed because 
of existing oversupply. Indeed, Donegal, Kerry, Mayo, Tipperary, and all the Upper Shannon 
counties of Leitrim, Sligo, Cavan, Roscommon and Longford are projected to still have 
oversupply in 2021.  The Housing Agency (2014) report analyzed housing need for 272 
towns and cities across the country for the period 2014-18. It argued that there was a need for 
80,000 new units, or 16,000 per annum. 37,500 units (47%) would need to be built in Dublin, 
or 7,500 units per annum.  The overall national required rate of between 12,500-16,000 per 
annum is actually quite modest.  Typically over the past forty five years new build has been 
20-30,000 per annum, rising to 40,000+ post 1998.  Indeed, 12,500 is in fact lower that the 
lowest build rate going back to when DECLG records start in 1970. 
 In theory, a lot of the right criteria for creating supply exist. There is an excess of 
demand: there are 6,400 acres of zoned serviced land available in the four Dublin authorities 
for 132,000 units (DECLG 2014); there are a lot of outstanding planning permissions still in 
effect and local authorities want to give permission for developments that meet development 
plan/zoning criteria; and material and labour costs of significantly lower than the boom time.  
Yet despite these conditions and the need to create supply it is clear that a hangover from 
phase 2 of the crisis is blocking development.  The state’s finances are limited, there are 
competing demands for scarce resources, and they are reluctant to significantly increase 
capital spending on housing and associated infrastructure.  The banks are in a weak state and 
reluctant to lend for development.  Builders and developers have no initial capital to draw 
down additional finance.  With respect to land, it may be the case that owners are reluctant to 
put into development because they bought it in the boom and cannot afford to develop at 
present housing prices.  With respect to planning, it may be that developers are seeking 
permissions that contravene development plans or are trying to alter existing permissions.  
The property industry also argue the system needs streamlining and simplifying.  They also 
make the case that there are too many taxes and disincentives attached to building, such as 
development levies, VAT, stamp duty, and building regulation and control costs, that amount 
to a sizable proportion of any sale price.  Crucially perhaps has been the emergent tension 
between different types of investment finance in Irish property markets.  In the post-crash era 
the state has introduced a series of new financial measures, including the establishment of 
NAMA and Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), which bundled together property 
portfolios, thus making it easier for international funds to invest in Irish property assets.  The 
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rate of return on these investments is often more favourable and seen to be less risky than it 
would be to invest in new construction projects.  This is likely to  be having a negative effect 
on the ability of Irish property developers to raise finance for new development projects.  
NAMA’s need for rental growth is likely to be one of the reasons the Government is refusing 
to give private tenants (the majority of those on social housing lists) relief through rent 
controls. By pushing for maximum commercial returns, NAMA is working against the 
interests of those looking for an affordable and secure home. It is continuing the speculative-
asset approach to housing that fuelled the crisis. This promotes residential property as a 
commodity rather than a social good.  In this sense, NAMA is facilitating a massive transfer 
of wealth created by the Irish people to foreign and domestic investors.  The combination of 
these factors is fuelling a set of related supply-led crises that seems set to continue for a 
number of years until sufficiently addressed.   
 
Conclusion 
The last twenty five years has seen a tumultuous set of changes with regards to Ireland’s 
housing sector and market.  Throughout the entire period it has been in crises that have 
developed in three phases.  In the first phase, there were crises of creating enough supply, 
very quickly rising prices to levels that were unaffordable for low and middle income 
households and reduced competitiveness, a significant increase in household debt and bank 
debt to precarious levels, over-zoning of land and dramatic price increases, the expansion of 
urban sprawl and long distance commuting.  While such changes were celebrated by the 
property sector, politicians and the media, they placed significant stresses on households and 
fuelled a huge property sector bubble that placed the wider economy at risk.  The unfolding 
of this phase was shaped by the adoption of a neoliberal ideas and practices with respect to 
governance and economy.  This prioritised market-led development, deregulation, public-
private partnerships, and low corporate taxation.  Both construction and banking sectors saw 
a relaxation of regulatory oversight.  The state started to withdraw from social housing 
provision, instead relying on the private rental sector, and when it did provide social housing 
it was through PPPs.  While demand was high, the property sector was afforded a range of 
very generous tax breaks and incentives.  Moreover, there was a laissez-faire, uncoordinated 
approach to housing and planning policy.  The planning system became developer-led, being 
pro-growth in ethos with a presumption for development operating, and was consistently 
undermined by localism, clientelism, and cronyism.  In short, Irish policy was uncoordinated, 
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piecemeal and favoured development interests, with too few checks and balances, thus 
enabling a property bubble to rapidly inflate, accompanied by an oversupply of stock. 
 The result was that when the property bubble burst, the fallout was catastrophic for 
households, the state, and the wider economy.  House prices plunged, estates remained 
unfinished, households were faced with extensive mortgage arrears and negative equity or 
poor build quality, the social housing waiting list extended, and more households became 
homelessness.  Rather than a radical change in policy, however, the Irish government’s 
response to the crash was to persist with the same neoliberal ethos, protecting the interests of 
the banking and development sector through bank bailouts and the creation of NAMA, to 
enforce austerity measures that placed significant stresses on households, and to make little to 
no changes to housing and planning policy other than to significantly cut the resourcing of 
the responsible departments and local authorities and to massively reduce capital spend on 
regeneration and new social housing stock.  Indeed, most policy has been a minimal effort, 
minimal cost in nature, with few legislative and policy changes, and a hope that the market 
returns and economy recovers and serendipitously fixes the problems.  In part, this was due to 
the same government being in place post-crash as pre-, followed by diktats from the IMF-
EU-ECB as part of the sovereign debt bailout.  But was also the result of an unwillingness to 
implement reform and put in place a strategic, coordinated approach to development.  
Instead, policy related to housing and planning remained fractured and fragmented in the 
years immediately after the crash, lacking any systematic or integrated framework.   
 Instead of the market returning and fixing the problems, a third phase in the crisis has 
emerged in which in selected areas demand has risen, oversupply has been mopped up, but no 
new supply is being created.  This has driven up purchase and rental prices, but also created 
rising homelessness.  The government response has been Construction 2020, a strategy that 
‘aims to ensure that necessary and sensible development can take place, and that it is not held 
back by unnecessary obstacles’ (Irish Government 2014).  It details 75 action points, though 
they are not framed within an overall holistic framework.  However, rather than setting out 
concrete policies, it charts a roadmap for finding solutions rather than providing solutions, 
proposing a set of new committees, task forces, review groups, and consultations.  Seven 
years after the crash started and much inaction there is now a strategy for thinking about 
action.  Key elements of the strategy such as the revised national spatial strategy will not be 
in place until the end of 2015, let alone implemented.  Just as supply and demand became 
disconnected in the Celtic Tiger years, policy responses and the post-crash crises have 
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become disconnected, hopelessly out of sync with each other in terms of the actions needed 
and the temporal speed and resourcing required.  The consequence is that the stresses and 
pressures of a failing housing sector and austerity measures continues to bear down on 
households, with international speculative finance once again driving property prices. 
 In our view, two things need to happen to help address the crises we have discussed.  
First, the government needs to fast-track Construction 2020, reframing it into a holistic, 
sustainable and non-cyclical approach to housing and planning -- that frames them as a sector 
and public good, not a simply a vehicle for capital accumulation -- and to start implementing 
policy and programmes.  At the top of the agenda must be resolving unfinished estates, 
making them safe and attractive places to live, to prioritize creating supply in selected areas 
including an extensive social housing building programme, and to tackle the issue of 
homelessness.  We appreciate that to date policy making in Ireland has been piecemeal, with 
different elements introduced at different times by varying governments and ministers with 
different ideological ambitions and a limited time horizon (the next election as opposed to 
fifty years time), and also the multi-scalar and multi-agency nature of delivery and 
governance of housing, and the diversity vested interests with different modus operandi and 
ambitions operating in the sector and seeking to influence policy and delivery.  However, it is 
vital that a holistic approach is quickly established and enacted, rather than becoming bogged 
down in politics and inaction (it is interesting that policy to guarantee banks and bailouts 
costing billions can be taken overnight, but measures to tackle long-term housing crises can 
be neglected for years).   
 Second, the government needs to lessen austerity measures and be a more pro-active 
player in the housing sector, using construction and investment in social housing and selected 
public infrastructure as a way of tackling housing issues at the same time as growing the 
economy, as well as taking a more active role in the private rented sector.  This includes 
using NAMA to provide sites, stock and finance for the provision of social and private 
housing without seeking to gain maximum commercial return thus over-inflating prices.  The 
private rented sector now accounts for a fifth of all households and in urban centres it is even 
more significant with almost 40% of people renting in Galway, 35% in Dublin, and 29% in 
Cork.  Government could pass regulation to restrict the rate of rent inflation in any one tax 
year to, for example, 5%, and then recouping a higher rate of tax on rental incomes where a 
landlord has breached this cap. However, there are no moves to do so. The reason is that 
housing policy remains dominated by the interests of the property industry including the 
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banks, developers, estate agents, solicitors, landlords, and increasingly, international capital 
and vulture fund investors who are buying up huge swathes of Irish residential property, who 
all seek rapidly rising property prices. Unless there is a more pro-active, coordinated response 
the crises of phase two will effect households for much longer, and the crises of phase three 
will deepen, worsen, and last for much longer. 
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